Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Role of the Payment Structure

(with Vladimir Vladimirov), Journal of Finance, 2025, 80 (3), 1769-1813.

 

Worker Runs 

(with Vladimir Vladimirov), Journal of Finance, 2025, 80 (2), 937-979. 

Non-technical summary for FT-Insights can be found here.

  

The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements

(with Roman Inderst and Marcus Opp), Journal of Finance, 2022, 77 (4), 2423-2470.

Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance post can be found here.

 

Dynamic Multitasking and Managerial Investment Incentives 

(with Sebastian Pfeil), Journal of Financial Economics, 2021, 142 (2), 954-974. 

The Online Appendix with some supplementary material can be found here.

 

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation 

(with Roman Inderst and Marcus Opp), Review of Economic Studies, 2021, 88 (3), 1253-1278.

 

Persuasion through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation

(with Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani), Management Science, 2020, 66 (11), 4958-4979. 

 

Taxing Externalities under Financing Constraints 

(with Roman Inderst and Ulf Moslener), Economic Journal, 2017, 127 (606), 2478-2503.

Pre-Sale Information 

(with Roman Inderst), Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146 (6), 2333-2355.

Supplement with some additional material: Supplement to "Pre-Sale Information".

Older (working paper) version: Price Discrimination and the Provision of Information.

 

Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model 

(with Sebastian Pfeil), Review of Financial Studies, 2010, 23 (9), 3329-3345.  

 

Impact Through Catalytic Finance

(with Vladimir Vladimirov)

Abstract: Impact investments requiring industry-wide adoption often stall because of a coordination trap: success depends on both individual firm effort and sufficient peer uptake, creating strategic complementarities. We study optimal financing by an impact investor who seeks to uniquely implement universal adoption while maximizing her guaranteed payoff. In this coordination environment with hidden effort, inducing coordination generally requires distorting firms' effort incentives. To manage this trade-off, the impact investor finances an endogenously chosen critical mass of firms using distortive concessionary contracts, which unlocks competitive, non-concessionary financing for the remaining firms. Unlike uniform taxes or subsidies, optimal impact financing is discriminatory in both instrument (e.g., debt vs. equity) and contractual terms, and its costs depend critically on how this heterogeneous financing is allocated across firms. Concessionary terms are optimally directed toward smaller, less efficient firms with high opportunity costs, whereas larger, better-run firms---essential for adoption---are financed at (near-)competitive terms.

 

Disliking to Disagree

(with Kiryl Khalmetski and Mark T. Le Quement)

Abstract: We formalize the notion of belief homophily under asymmetric information by introducing a preference for perceived disagreement aversion. We then study its implications for information sharing in a standard voluntary disclosure model in which sender and receiver have heterogeneous priors. Equilibrium disclosure by the perceived disagreement averse sender is partial and biased towards the prior opinion of the more confident party. A given receiver learns more from senders whose prior opinion differ more from his own but whose prior confidence level are more similar to his own. Senders’ preferences over communication partners induce assortative matching in prior opinions, which hurts information sharing.

 

Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation

(with Roman Inderst and Sergey Turlo)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the welfare implications of regulating consumers' rights of product return and contract cancellation. The key feature of our model of consumer experimentation is that, after returning a product, consumers turn back to the market and thereby exert a positive pecuniary externality on other firms. As a consequence, in the unregulated market equilibrium, there are always too few such cancellations and returns. A mandatory extension of consumers' rights of cancellation and return, in the form of commonly observed statutory minimum refund periods, increases efficiency only when consumers' share of the surplus is low, and it exacerbates the market failure when it is high. We also show that the generosity of consumers' cancellation rights is not a good predictor of market performance or competition in the market. 

 

Dividend Regulation and Risk-Taking in a Dynamic Model of Banking (with Sebastian Pfeil)

 

The Dynamics of Cap and Trade (with Sebastian Pfeil)