The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements

(with Roman Inderst and Marcus Opp), Journal of Finance, 2022, 77 (4), 2423-2470.

Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance post can be found here.


Dynamic Multitasking and Managerial Investment Incentives 

(with Sebastian Pfeil), Journal of Financial Economics, 2021, 142 (2), 954-974. 

The Online Appendix with some supplementary material can be found here.


Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation 

(with Roman Inderst and Marcus Opp)Review of Economic Studies, 2021, 88 (3), 1253-1278.


Persuasion through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation

(with Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani), Management Science, 2020, 66 (11), 4958-4979. 


Taxing Externalities under Financing Constraints 

(with Roman Inderst and Ulf Moslener), Economic Journal, 2017, 127 (606), 2478-2503.

Supplementary material: Working paper versionOnline Appendix.


Pre-Sale Information 

(with Roman Inderst), Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146 (6), 2333-2355.

Supplement with some additional material: Supplement to "Pre-Sale Information".

Older (working paper) version: Price Discrimination and the Provision of Information.


Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model 

(with Sebastian Pfeil), Review of Financial Studies, 2010, 23 (9), 3329-3345.  


Working Papers

Worker Runs 

(with Vladimir Vladimirov), revise & resubmit Journal of Finance

Abstract: The voluntary departure of hard-to-replace skilled workers worsens firm prospects, which can prompt additional departures. We develop a model in which firms design compensation to limit the risk of such "worker runs." To achieve cost-efficient retention, firms use fixed wages and dilutable compensation - such as vesting equity or bonus pools - that pays remaining workers more when others leave but gets diluted otherwise. The optimal degree of dilution and its implementation depend on the firm's production technology, relative risk exposure, and financial constraints. Compensating workers with differently-structured compensation can further mitigate worker runs by ensuring a critical retention level.


Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Role of the Payment Structure

(with Vladimir Vladimirov), revise & resubmit Journal of Finance

Abstract: We investigate a seller's strategic choice between negotiating with fewer bidders and running an auction with additional bidders, allowing for general security payments. The key factor favoring negotiations is the seller's rent-extraction benefit of setting her preferred payment structure; reserve prices are of secondary importance. Negotiations are more valuable if the seller's asset creates more value at more productive bidders - in which case sellers prefer contingent payments while bidders prefer cash - and if the dispersion and magnitude of bidders' private valuations are higher. Our results have implications for mergers and acquisitions, patent licensing, and compensation negotiations in tight labor markets.


Disliking to Disagree

(with Kiryl Khalmetski and Mark T. Le Quement), revise & resubmit JEEA

Abstract: We formalize the notion of belief homophily under asymmetric information by introducing a preference for perceived disagreement aversion. We then study its implications for information sharing in a standard voluntary disclosure model in which sender and receiver have heterogeneous priors. Equilibrium disclosure by the perceived disagreement averse sender is partial and biased towards the prior opinion of the more confident party. A given receiver learns more from senders whose prior opinion differ more from his own but whose prior confidence level are more similar to his own. Senders’ preferences over communication partners induce assortative matching in prior opinions, which hurts information sharing.


Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation

(with Roman Inderst and Sergey Turlo)EEA 2017 Meetings Paper.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the welfare implications of regulating consumers' rights of product return and contract cancellation. The key feature of our model of consumer experimentation is that, after returning a product, consumers turn back to the market and thereby exert a positive pecuniary externality on other firms. As a consequence, in the unregulated market equilibrium, there are always too few such cancellations and returns. A mandatory extension of consumers' rights of cancellation and return, in the form of commonly observed statutory minimum refund periods, increases efficiency only when consumers' share of the surplus is low, and it exacerbates the market failure when it is high. We also show that the generosity of consumers' cancellation rights is not a good predictor of market performance or competition in the market. 

Work in Progress

Dividend Regulation and Risk-Taking in a Dynamic Model of Banking (with Sebastian Pfeil)


The Dynamics of Cap and Trade (with Sebastian Pfeil)